

**An Analysis of China's International Relations and Diplomacy Strategy and its IMPACT on selected Cases: SANEZ**

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**1. Introduction**

The rise of China as an economic powerhouse in the twenty first century, including the growing FDI is an on-going debate as to China's part within these nations, with particular reference to the following classifications numbers 1.1. – 1.4. (Leke et al. (2010) and referred as SANEZ (Pak: 2014).

**1.1. Diversified economics and also are Africa's growth engines: South Africa, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia** which are already broadly diversified.

**1.2. Oil exporters: Enhancing growth through diversification: Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya** and is Africa's oil and gas exporters and also have the continent's highest GDP per capita, but are also the least diversified economies.

**1.3. Transition economies: Building on current gains: Zambia, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and.**

**1.4. Pre-transition economies: Strengthening the basics: Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Sierra Leone**—are still very poor, with GDP per capita of just \$353—one-tenth that of the diversified countries.

## **2. Current Developments and Research Topic Choice**

China's international strategic importance stemmed first from the fact that alone of the other countries in the world it claimed to be able to defend itself from either of the superpowers. China also benefited from its geographical location and its perceived potential, and its deft diplomacy has turned China into a proactive player that is shaping the new regionalism in East Asia and a participant in developing a new global order.

Many global problems cannot be properly addressed without China's participation. These include addressing global economic imbalances, preventing the proliferation of WMD, tackling climate change issues, countering international terrorism, preventing health pandemics etc.

China economy has slowed down, but the literature points to how it has welded its soft power, escalating its economic might and unique political system and created social synergies, over the past decade this has been fuelling a debate on the feasibility of a seismic geopolitical shift in the international system.

Academic discussions have been set around two major questions: whether China is on track to become the next superpower, and if so, what kind of superpower it will be.

Perhaps more significantly, despite much talk of the 'Chinese model' or the 'Beijing Consensus', neither the Chinese government, nor its many academics and commentators on international affairs, present their country as a model. The Chinese government continues to approach international issues and global concerns from its perspectives.

Much the same may be said of China's renewed engagement with Africa after a twenty to thirty year hiatus since the Maoist revolutionary days. China has become a major investor in Africa, primarily in the extractive industries, and in the process it has focused on developing infrastructure. However, the Chinese are increasingly sharing the same Western concerns about sustainability and the local capacity to fulfil promises. The Chinese have also found themselves having to deal with local discontent about labour practices and the importation of Chinese labour.

In 2007, for example, the total value of Chinese investment in Africa came to about \$7.5 billion, that of the US \$13 billion and of Europe \$25 billion. Nevertheless, China has become an important player in Africa and that has contributed greatly to its new global stature. These include the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, especially those that accept the legitimacy of diverse systems of government and that advocate non-interference.

The rapid growth of China's expanding industrialized base and urban population, led to mounting domestic demand for power and movement that drained most of China's natural resources, and fired an ever-growing external reliance on fossil fuels and strategic minerals.

In terms of the pertinent literature, if only five years ago literature on the topic was very scarce, at present information and analysis abound, spanning from numerous articles in journals or online publications, through edited books and monographs, doctoral theses, and reports by governmental agencies, international organisation and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

In addition, several institutions have been monitoring developments. Reflecting the much faster engagement of China with Africa, research in this field has become more conspicuous and the degree of analysis gradually more complex.

The few existing academic publications covering China's relations with more than one developing region, do not pursue comparative analysis. In recent years Chinese scholars and institutions have also been contributing increasingly to the debate on both regions. Chinese scholars have been actively participating in seminars and conferences around the world, publishing in English and simultaneously engaging a lot more with field research, regarded as a major hindrance in Chinese scholarly work until recently. In China, many old Africa and Latin America academic research units have been revitalised and new centres have been set up.

A significant part of the ongoing academic debate on China's growing engagement with developing regions has, however, been locked into a debate of an increasingly ideological tone. This debate is around whether China is just another neo-colonialist power in search of raw materials and markets or if Beijing is just seizing opportunities in more levelled terrains. Although this debate falls outside the scope of this thesis, it underlines a common feature in the existing literature, which is the acknowledgment of China's resources quest as a defining trait of its engagement in Africa and South America.

The still scarce number of studies on China's oil diplomacy in developing regions tends to focus on Africa.

It is the candidate's contention that the debate is lacking empirical, systematic and much needed comparative data to make a contribution to filling this gap, which is critical for improving the understanding of China's interaction with developing regions.

## **2. Research Questions and Hypothesis**

The first hypothesis on the impact of China's influence on the African nation's classifications:

H1: China's munificence is positively related to the African economies classifications: Trade and Economic performance.

All of which suggests:

H2: China's International Relations and Diplomacy strategies are critical to its own domestic and global ambitions.

H3: China's diplomatic dynamism is positively related to its domestic economic growth.

H4: China's effect on the African nation's classifications has a significant effect on the African states international relations and diplomacy.

H5: China's support regarding foreign direct investment play a major role in contributing to local development.

### **3. Research Objectives**

- To dispel the notion that China's involvement within Africa, impedes and or does not contribute to Africa's domestic trade and economy.

- African and Chinese leaders are building, sustainable international relations, which are composites and beneficial for both nations to prosper.

- African nations are significantly expanding and building necessitated infrastructure and fundamental to avoiding the 'resource curse'

- Thus leading to social, economic and international diplomacy transformation that contributes to the harmonization of their own internal stability and conduciveness'.

- China's foreign direct contribution actively supports local development and this reduces the negative effects of Africa's brain drain.

### **4. Research Perspective**

The study's perspective will adopt Morgenthau's (1948/1978) two theories of the state (systemic and non-systemic) to build on the hypothesis and expand/argue the objectives. According to the researcher and evidenced by the literature, China has experienced the following Phases: Pre-1949, 1949 – 1976; 1977 – 2000 and 2001 and the rationale for using Morgenthau are captured under the phases as:

#### **4.1. Minor (first) 'systemic theory' of the state: the 'passive-adaptive (intelligent) state:**

The researcher sees this in relation, with Morgenthau as:

I. Pre-1949: '*Anarchical years*': i.e. from the dynasties to Hong Kong/Macao cessation, the issues of Nationalism, the rise of Communism, the Cambodian Wars, the Great War.

In this phase, the researcher argues that Morgenthau's statement: 'the policy of the status quo refer to a foreign policy in which a 'satisfied' state has no desire to change the distribution of power in its favour (usually the policy of a dominant power

II. 1949 – 1976: '*Machiavellian Years*': Mao Tse Tung, Korean War, Wenchuang Earthquake, Cultural Revolution, Great Leap Forward.

#### 4.2. Major (second) 'non-systemic' theory of the state: the state as the determining agent of international politics:

The researcher uses Morgenthau's third aspect of intelligence as the need to evaluate the national power bases of their opponents, and to adapt the states national strength to that of others through emulation (as in Waltz), including the eight factors of national strength.

But, in particular, the government must be intelligent, so that it can balance resources against commitments.

In the researcher's view, this is related to the following:

III. 1977 – 2000: '*New China*': Deng Xiaopeng, Hybrid rice farming, Jiang Zheming.

IV. 2001 – Present: '*New, new and Modern China*': WTO membership, Hu Jintao, Olympic Games, Africa's FDI, Global Bankers, Territorial disputes, Xi Jinping.

In retrospect, the researcher sees Morgenthau as a realist and the means for the creation of such a prerequisite is that of 'compensatory diplomacy' which must follow Morgenthau's nine rubrics.

#### **4. Literature Review**

China prescribes to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence: mutual respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

China and Africa's relationship can be defined by the following statistics: annual two-way trade has risen from under \$5-billion in the mid-1990s to touch \$150-billion today; Chinese investment totals \$40-billion today from virtually zero 15 years ago; the People's Republic imports 1.5 million barrels of oil daily, or one-third of its requirements, from Africa; and the number of Chinese working in Africa is estimated to have increased tenfold to number around one million over the past 20 years.

The most important point here is that China's transformation has been responsible for much of the increase in global commodity prices, and this has driven up African growth rates. Africa remains

heavily dependent on mineral commodities, which make up more than two-thirds of its exports, and as much as 70% in the case of Zambia or 90% in the case of Nigeria (Mills, 2012).

In order to analyse this subject one shall draw on concepts and tools of foreign policy analysis (FPA).

### **Foreign policy analysis and theoretical approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy analysis is a subfield of International Relations (IR) that seeks to explain foreign policy, drawing much of its insights from IR theory. Theories of international politics, as Waltz acknowledged cannot fully account for states' reactions to pressures in a given system. While IR is more concerned with patterns of outcomes of states interactions, FPA focuses on the dynamics behind states' behaviour in the international realm. The analysis of this process is in fact much more intricate than the study of international politics, since it merges two levels of analysis (domestic and international), in which actors and structures interact in a complex manner. This reality makes it difficult to conceptualise, explain and assess the role of agent and structure in this process, a fact that made FPA a controversial analytical subject since its materialization following the Second World War.

Defying the challenging complexity of the subject, analysts struggled in the following decades to elaborate a general theory drawing on sets of different explanatory factors. Gideon Rose divides these contributions into four main schools: the *Innenpolitik* theories which emphasise the role of domestic factors in foreign policy formulation; offensive realism which stresses the determining role of systemic factors; defensive realism which upholds that systemic factors explain most foreign policy decisions but not all; and neoclassical realism which attempts to account for both external and internal factors.

The *Innenpolitik* approach assumes internal factors such as political and economic regimes, socioeconomic structure, political factionalism, or national identity, are the independent variable. Most FPA studies produced between the 1950s and 1970s were of this nature and closely inspired by behaviouralism, stressed different domestic factors: the structure and process of groups making foreign policy decisions (Richard Snyder, 1950s); the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics (G. Allison and Halperin, 1970s); and the psychological dimension (Harold and Margaret Sprout, 1950s and 1960s). In the late 1970s the field began to fall out of fashion, set against the rise of rational choice modeling and the neorealist theory which emphasized systemic structures.

Stemming both from neorealist theory, the defensive and offensive realism schools depart from the same basic assumptions: states operating in an anarchical international system and the centrality of relative distribution of power. The structure of international system is thus the independent variable in both approaches. The main difference is that defensive realism (e.g.

Waltz) is a little more benign, sustaining that states do not seek power beyond that is needed for security and survival, while offensive realism (e.g. Mearsheimer) argues that states seek hegemony and are ultimately more aggressive and act therefore to prevent the emergence of hegemons in other regions. In this latter view, foreign policy will be exclusively shaped by the state's relative capabilities and the external environment. In the case of defensive realism there is less room for domestic variables since aggressive behaviour is seen as unnatural and dependent on the perception of the threat.

Like *Innenpolitik*, offensive and defensive realism oversimplify the equation by focusing on only one level (domestic factors or international structure, respectively) and hence provide inaccurate calculations. As Gideon points out, unit-level analysis fails to account why states with similar domestic structures act in different ways and why diverse states frequently act alike. The same is true about offensive and defensive realism, as different states facing similar systemic frameworks do not always act in similar ways, or even the same state in the same situation can act differently at two different points in time.

Drawing from a handful of works done in the post-Cold War setting, Gideon Rose notes that a new approach emerged in the 1990s that offers a way out of this predicament by inserting an intervening variable in the neorealist equation. In this perspective relative material power draws the basic contours of a state's foreign policy, but does not fully determine its foreign policy behaviour, as this depends on decision-makers' perceptions of relative material power. This means, for instance, that leadership changes may account for foreign policy discontinuity in this regard, and that different balances between state structure and their respective society may affect their ability to allocate natural resources over time. Systemic factors do constrain foreign policy options, but it is the perceptions (sometimes misperceptions) at the unit level that influence the choices thereof.

Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that relative material power assumes a key position in this theoretical model and therefore this should be the departure point for any foreign policy analysis. Relative material power refers to states' capabilities and resources to influence each other, and the relative position in the international system that derives from this. States' relative material power affects the way they perceive systemic forces and subsequently the way they behave.

Another important assumption of neoclassical realism is that more than security, states seek stability in an anarchical international system through attempting to control their external environment. Furthermore, states which search for influence, tend to follow closely the expansion or contraction of their material resources. The corollary is that the relative amount of material power resources shape the aspirations and the range of states' foreign policy.

Unlike the defensive and offensive branches of neorealism, which came into existence primarily as a means to interpret international politics, the neoclassical realist branch's core concern is in the analysis of foreign policy at a given place and time through the interface

between the domestic and systemic realms.

China's increasing openness to the outside world and gradual engagement in multilateral *fora* such as the UN and the WTO, has exposed a bit more of the Chinese foreign policy 'black box' to scholarly research. This allowed for a closer look at the unit level structure and actors, access to which remained restricted throughout most of the existence of the PRC. China's Foreign Policy (CFP) studies emerged in the 1960s and 1970s within 'China' area studies, a significant part of which related to China's anti-colonial ventures in Africa.

International relations scholarly works on CFP remained relatively scarce until recently.

Interestingly enough, domestic politics and neoclassic realism seem to have inspired a significant part of contemporary CFP studies. This is partly justified by the increasing access to domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy, and the manifest insufficiency of the neorealist school to assess the increasing complexity of China's foreign policy as it enters the global stage.

Offering arguably the most suitable theoretical framework to analyse CFP making, neoclassical realism has, nonetheless, its own shortcomings. The first one is related to the abstract nature of perceptions and thus the inability to assess, on the one hand, the ways in which ideational, cultural and psychological factors affect unit-level perceptions of their own and others relative to material power, and on the other hand how these perceptions turn into foreign policy. The second shortcoming relates to the increasing influence of new agents in foreign policy orientations. As Shaun Breslin argues, referring to the specific case of China's IR, these approaches miss key determinants such as the interaction of a multiplicity of economic and political agents active at the domestic and international levels, that need to be equated to fully theorise contemporary Chinese foreign policy making.

### **Foreign economic policy: economic diplomacy and economic statecraft**

Owing to its object of study (infrastructure-for-oil loans) this thesis is concerned with the economic realm of foreign policy. Even though security and political concerns have been predominant in foreign policy literature, economic issues have been a constant element in state's foreign policies from the early days.

To a great extent foreign economic policy has evolved as a tool to manage domestic and international economic goals in a context of growing economic interdependence. As noted by Peter Katzenstein 'the main rationale of all strategies [of foreign economic policy] is to establish a basic compatibility between domestic and international policy objectives' and as such these strategies 'grow out of the interaction of international and domestic forces.'

Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno identify three main theoretical approaches to explain foreign economic policy: international or system-centred; society centred and state centred. Systemic approaches view FEP as a function of the state's relative material power and international



constraints or opportunities. Society centred approaches explain FEP as a function of domestic politics - the result of the struggle for influence among various interest groups or political parties. State-centred approaches emphasize the institutional structures of the state and the capacity of government official to realise their objectives in light of domestic and international constraints. Bayne and Woolcock have made an invaluable contribution to this debate with three editions of *The New Economic Diplomacy* (2003, 2007 and 2011).

Reflecting the increasingly complex and fast changing nature of contemporary foreign economic relations they underline the much wider scope and content of economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is ‘about how states conduct their international economic relations (...): how they make decisions domestically; how they negotiate with each other internationally; and how these processes interact.’

Through their lenses economic diplomacy is concerned with:

- (1) International economic issues - domestic and international economic realms, however, have become closely intertwined due to spiralling interdependence;
- (2) Governmental activities in all its formats (ministries, departments, embassies and agencies) – though non-state actors such as private business sector and NGO’s increasingly shape governmental policies;
- (3) The impact of markets – unlike political diplomacy, economic diplomacy is sensitive to market developments in that they influence and shape the actors involved;
- (4) A wide range of instruments – from informal and voluntary cooperation to binding regulations as well as economic incentives and sanctions, also referred to as economic statecraft.

This apparent overlap between economic diplomacy and economic statecraft has sometimes led to the incorrect use of the two terms as synonyms. The clarification of this confusion is critical in the context of this thesis as it justifies why one employs the term ‘economic statecraft’ and not ‘economic diplomacy’. Bayne and Woolcock emphasise that economic diplomacy is not defined by its instruments but by the economic negotiation that provide its content, namely policies related to trade, investment, services, cooperation, aid, information and their regulation. Further to this they add that while economic diplomacy refers to concrete negotiations, economic statecraft has a broader connotation sometimes linked to a ‘grand strategy’.

This distinction is clearly in line with the thinking of one of the founding theorists of economic statecraft: D. Baldwin. According to him, diplomacy refers to influence attempts primarily through negotiation while economic statecraft concerns influence attempts through the

use of economic sanctions or rewards.

The above mentioned reasons justify thus why this thesis is not about economic diplomacy but about economic statecraft. Its focus is not on how a particular instrument of foreign economic policy came into being, its content and the negotiation process, but rather on the efficacy of the instrument at the implementation level in two different institutional contexts.

### *Economic statecraft as a foreign policy instrument*

Policies are not self-executing. Channelling intentions into outcomes involves the selection and use of what, at the time, is assessed to be the best available means to achieve objectives. The wrong choice of means can not only distort original intentions, but also seriously compromise what is achieved by a given policy. The choice of the instrument to be used is therefore a key point in the implementation phase.

The use of instruments by policy makers, in order to pursue a certain foreign goal, is commonly referred to as statecraft. While there is no consensual taxonomy of foreign policy instruments, most authors tend to list them in ascending order from soft to hard measures, and ranging from diplomacy to military intervention. A less controversial sorting is Mastanduno's division of statecraft instruments into three major categories: diplomatic, military and economic.

Even though the use of economic instruments can be traced back to ancient Greece, diplomatic and military tools have historically occupied the centre stage in foreign policy making - inspiring most international relations literature from Machiavelli to Clausewitz. In sharp contrast with diplomacy (an attempt to influence through negotiations) and military statecraft (attempt to influence through the use of force), the use of economic statecraft has been underestimated by most analysts, and has therefore received little attention from scholars.

This thesis, however, is not concerned with the study of negative economic statecraft, as China does not have a record of making use of these tools bilaterally, nor multilaterally. Since its accession to UN Security Council in 1971, China has in most cases abstained from voting on economic sanctions resolutions. On the other hand, Beijing has made profuse use of economic inducements in pursuing its foreign policy goals since the founding of the PRC. China has, in fact, a long track of resorting to economic inducements in pursuing its foreign policy goals. In exchange for political allegiance to the communist cause, China extended in the 1960s and 1970s soft loans to African countries, some of which were for infrastructure construction using Chinese equipment and labour.

Positive economic statecraft, as defined by Mastanduno, means "the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state." He distinguishes two

types of positive economic statecraft in regard to the ends they intent to pursue: tactical linkage and structural linkage. The first one (also called specific positive linkage) envisages an immediate outcome through the provision of a specific economic inducement (i.e. Marshal Plan). Structural linkage (or general positive linkage), on the other hand, involves a long-term engagement providing a steady stream of economic inducements. These generally favour economic interdependence that gradually transforms domestic interests in the target country, and ultimately leads to a growing influence over the policy options of the weaker state, ultimately consolidating a coalition with the sanctioning states. This type of economic inducement is in a way linked to the concept of ‘soft power’, developed by Joseph Nye (‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want’).

Although the use of economic inducements has become more apparent in the context of the fast growing economic interdependence that characterises the post-Cold War World, academic research on positive economic statecraft remains scant. Aimed at contributing to filling this gap, this thesis argues that economic statecraft is a key tool in China’s current foreign policy towards developing regions, and that it has been reasonably successful in achieving Beijing’s goals.

In order to pursue its ends though, the means need to be deployed in the target countries, where the interplay with the local environment will determine the outcome.

### **Foreign policy implementation**

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the performance of a specific foreign policy instrument when put into practice. Because foreign policy choices are not self-executing, the emphasis is put on channelling intentions into outcomes. This entails the interplay between the actor’s strategy and the targeted context, knitting together the domestic with the international. Underlying this exercise is the agency-structure dilemma: what best explains foreign policy outcomes: the actor’s preferences/interests or external constrains? In order to better understand this interplay one shall depart from the ‘strategic-relational’ approach.

The strategic-relational model was originally developed by Colin Hay and later applied to foreign policy analysis by Elisabetta Brighi. According to this model neither strategy nor context isolated can explain foreign policy outcomes. The success or failure of foreign policies is determined by the dialectic interplay between internal preferences and external constrains. It is called strategic, because the actor’s actions envisage the attainment of certain goals; and is relational because it only becomes intelligible when analysed in relation to its environment.

According to Brighi and Hill, in analysing foreign policy implementation through this model, one must consider three basic assumptions. First, context has a relational nature. The successful implementation of a given foreign policy depends on how strategically placed the actor is and how correctly they interpret constraints and opportunities in the surrounding context.

Context has thus different meanings to different actors. Secondly, there is a constant interplay between actors and context at both material and perceptions levels, which are eventually internalised in the political process. And thirdly, this interactive process of action and reaction stimulates constant feedback from actor to context and vice versa, which may produce changes in the context or in the actor's strategy.

From an analytical perspective, the 'international' entails two dimensions at the implementation level: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal dimension involves the perimeter scope of its foreign policy, spanning from local to regional and global.

The scope depends on the actor's position in the environment, the resources at its disposal and the strategic value of these. The vertical dimension results from the functional stratification of the actor's interests/goals: political, economic, military, normative and cultural. The hierarchy amongst these varies according to the actor.

To finalise this conceptualisation, there is always a degree of interaction between the 'domestic' and the 'international' spheres in the process of implementing a certain foreign policy.

This entails the mobilisation of material and immaterial (nation's support) resources to achieve certain foreign policy objectives, and the pursuit of domestic goals through foreign policy (or vice-versa).

The instrument-context dynamics are therefore critical in determining whether the outcome will coincide with (success) or diverge from (failure) the expected ends. The conceptualisation of the context will therefore allow for a better understanding of the causes behind different regional outcomes regarding China's oil diplomacy in developing regions.

## **5. Gaps, Limitations and Areas for further investigation**

As China constantly moves at breakneck speed despite a current slowdown, for this year, its model is still a positive work in practice, new and updated information will constantly filter and contribute to the existing literature.

The timeline allocated to the research, although the literature readings will be as in depth as possible. Four African nations has only been randomly selected, although their interactions, with the principal country is unique and established.

China has increased its loans, FDI, and commitment to African nations and this will lead to newer IR models produced. As far as the researcher is aware, there is a lack of literature on an in depth analysis of particular research to the as mentioned nations.

## **6. Contribution**

- Continued specific interest in China and its IR and diplomacy strategies with African nations.

- Blueprint for other African nations, emerging, developing nations to see the best practices when dealing with an upcoming global power.
- Advance the knowledge on specific African nations.
- See an in-depth insight to China's IR strategic interactions.

## 7. Research Methodology

This research will be investigated in two different ways. One is qualitative questionnaire and the other is face-to-face review. The reason of undertaking these two methods and the way of investigating will be given below.

Table 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Qualitative Research

<b>Strengths of Qualitative Approach</b>	<b>Weaknesses of Qualitative Approach</b>
Data based on the participants' own categories of meaning	Knowledge produced might not be generalized to other people or other settings.
Provides understanding and description of people's personal experiences of phenomena	It is difficult to make quantitative predictions.
Can conduct cross-case comparisons and analysis	It is more difficult to test hypotheses and theories with large participant tools.
Can describe in rich detail phenomena as they are situated and embedded in local contexts	It might have lower credibility with some administrators and commissioners of programs.
Useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth	The results are easily influenced by the researchers' personal biases and idiosyncrasies.

Source: Mixed Method Practice, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989).

Table 2: Strengths and Weaknesses of Quantitative Research

<b>Strengths of Quantitative Approach</b>	<b>Weaknesses of Quantitative Approach</b>
Provide precise, quantitative numerical data	The research might be time consuming.
Can generalize a research finding when it has been replicated on many different populations and subpopulations	The researcher might miss out on phenomena occurring because of the focus on theory or hypothesis testing rather than on theory or hypothesis generation.

Testing and validating already constructed theories about how and why phenomena occur.	The researcher's categories that are used might not reflect local constituencies' understanding.
Useful for obtaining data that allow quantitative predictions to be made	Knowledge produced might be too abstract and general for direct application to specific local situations, contexts and individuals.
Useful for studying large numbers of people	

Source: Mixed Method Practice, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989).

Four criteria are addressed by qualitative researchers aiming to provide a persuasive case that their work sounds academically (Shenton, 2004). Addressing matters such as credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability will help prospective researches to assess the extent to which they are able to apply these generic strategies to their specific research (Shenton, 2004). To conclude, taking professionalism of this topic and time limitation into consideration, qualitative ones may be better for the research.

Questionnaire survey is a kind of quantity research methodology to get specific information through a list of research questions answered by interviewees. It is a list of a research or survey questions asked to respondents, and designed to extract specific information.

(Business dictionary website, 2009) Questionnaire survey can be used to collect basic first-hand data, compare and analyse data getting from survey and finally get the information required by interviewers.

The quality of questionnaire survey depends on the designing of the questions and the chosen of sample. It serves four basic purposes: to collect the appropriate data, make data comparable and amenable to analysis, minimize bias in formulating and asking question, and to make questions engaging and varied.

Yin and Song (2008) in their book stated the characters of questionnaire survey and proposed that compare with other survey methods, questionnaire survey has obvious advantages. Firstly, interviewees make their answers after consideration which improves the accuracy of the survey. Secondly, questionnaire is very easy to operate and can be widely used in different ways, such as on-line and by posting. Thirdly, questionnaire can be used to do quantitative Analysis.

Figures from questionnaire can be analysed by all kinds of methodologies to improve the scientific of survey result.

Case study approach on countries: SANEZ as specified

## 8. Sampling Method (still under review)

## 9. Preliminary Results and Conclusion

**This working paper investigates the emerging relationship between China and selected African countries i.e. SANEZ and**, analyses the character and content of China's trade and foreign policy towards the continent, and studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and diplomatic fields. It seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional structures guiding China's Africa policy, and to study China's growing power and influence so that it will help rather than hinder development prospects in Africa. Research deals with different dimensions of Chinese continental engagement (energy, resources, trade, investment, aid, development, agriculture, peace, security and multilateralism). The research also will be evaluating the 'China-Africa Toolkit' has been developed and is targeted at policy makers in Africa.

As demonstrated above, the adjustments that took place in China's economic statecraft allowed Beijing to pursue its oil security goals more efficiently in Africa. As China learns with practice, and adjusts its strategies to fit different institutional structures, its economic statecraft is bound to assume distinct characteristics in each region.

Conversely, China's access to oil acreage in Africa is likely to remain very reliant on the provision of preferential credit for infrastructure to resource-rich countries, and not many changes are expected regarding its major defining features. Against this background, the extension of preferential credit lines is expected to remain as a major Chinese positive economic statecraft tool for pursuing its energy goals in the regions. Notwithstanding all these issues, prospects are now much better than before the crisis. Chinese interests in African resources markets are bound to expand further in the near future, and are therefore expected to close the gap with Africa in coming years.

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