

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a workable typology of the different views involved in the ongoing debates on the so-called “practice-dependence” approach to justice. After establishing a first distinction between metaphysical, relational and practice-dependent conceptions of justice, I draw a line, among practice-dependent views, between institutionalism and cultural conventionalism. I complete this typology by differentiating between three forms of institutionalism according to how they regard the institutional fact, namely, the fact that individuals are always already placed in a state of submission to existing institutions. Whereas *de facto* institutionalism describes this fact as a mere factual reality that imposes itself upon human beings, *de jure* institutionalism regards it as a practical necessity that stands in need of justification to each and every individual. Finally, *moral institutionalism* accounts for the institutional fact in terms of moral duty, namely the duty to contribute to the emergence of a state of affairs in which everyone’s freedom of choice is respected.